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DECEPTIVE ROLES OF WOMEN IN ARABIC AND ENGLISH LITERATURE CONTEXT: A PRAGMATIC STUDY

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ABSTRACT

Usually, feminine characters are assigned different roles and spaces for expressing the self and their cultural identity through literary text. Through searching and studying the literary text, deep-rooted beliefs of life can be uncovered that highlight similarities and differences between people who are divided by regional areas, languages, and many other factors. Pragmatic tools can perceive and conceptualise many human aspects that need scientific attention. One of these aspects is the phenomenon of deception and its intricate human nature. Deception is the goal, pragmatic strategies are the mean, and the identity of deceptive women is the target of this study. The question here is how deception is viewed in literary text and specifically how insincere women are introduced in Arabic and English social novels. Consequently, the current research takes the goal of identifying the types of deception in English and Arabic novels with a special focus on female characters. For this purpose, two prominent novels are chosen: "Palace of Desire" for Naguib Mahfouz (1957) and East of Eden for John Steinbeck (1952), since they are widely read novels and have gone repeatedly through the process of materialisation in the form of movies and series. In this respect, deception strategies are divided into super, deceptive, and sub-strategies. Super strategies come from strategic Manuvering principles, while the act of deception is the result of violating one or more of Gricean maxims. Sub-strategies, on the other hand, stand for various pragmatic strategies. The results indicate that deception types in both novels are the same but authors, out of their different cultural backgrounds, prioritise different deceptive strategies. The English novel has a higher percentage of falsification. Alternatively, the Arabic novel reveals a higher percentage of concealment. This point is additionally reflected in the existence of a psychopathic character (Cathy) in the English novel and the absence of such a venomous character in the Arabic novel.

Keywords: *deception, strategic maneuvering, deceptive strategies, topical potential, audience demand, presentational devices.*

INTRODUCTION

As an unsanctioned behavior, deception was neglected by most early theories of communication. But out of its pervasive nature, most communication theories acknowledge its importance and amend their toolkit to tackle this socially condemned behaviour. Therefore, research in different areas of study investigates this phenomenon in depth. A literary text is full of deceptive strategies that could tell many things about its social and cultural environment. In this regard, the current study aims at identifying the most used

types of deception that result from performing pragmatic and cognitive strategies and illustrating the cultural effect on the literary text as far as deception is concerned. This behavior is investigated here pragmatically since this approach is concerned with what people can do with language, and deception is done verbally by manipulating the use of language. Accordingly, the current research hypothesises that culture has an influence on the statistics of pragmatic and cognitive strategies. Additionally, it hypothesises that both authors are skillful enough to

execute deception in accord with strategic maneuvering, and cognitive and pragmatic sub-strategies. Finally, the current research hypothesises that English female characters are more dangerous and serious in performing deception. An eclectic model has been developed to achieve the aims and verify the hypotheses. The current investigation uses a qualitative analysis supported by a quantitative one.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Pragmatics of Deception

Generally, deception is considered a complex phenomenon; hence it depicts the developmental level of mankind's psyche. A concrete source to view this behavior is the use of language particularly through literary text coming from different cultures. In this regard, cognitive and linguistic pragmatics can uncover interesting aspects concerning this area of inquiry by introducing certain questions that could illuminate this part of human communication. Originally, theory and research in the field of pragmatics have a logical tendency to inspect those aspects that belong to a normal way of communication (the cooperative one). The first comprehensive well-known work in this regard is by Herbert Paul Grice (1975), named the theory of meaning. The theory depicts how people manage to

communicate with each other and grasp the intended meaning of verbal messages.

Although the objectives are not the same between cooperative and uncooperative verbal behavior, the devices of a normal way of communication can be amended to handle those behaviors that deviate and indicate not-so-ethical aspects of human nature (Oswald, Didier, & Saussure, 2016). Grice (1975) includes deception in his theory and emphasises that this phenomenon is the result of the intentional and covert violation of communication maxims. Consequently, the actor of these violations is deemed to be a liar (Thomas, 1995). The research area after the introduction of Gricean theorising takes two main routes: the first stream is based on Gricean work (neo-Gricean) by depending on a linear account of interpretation and providing the early version of the theory with more contributions such as Horn and Levinson. Alternatively, post-Gricean scholars have proclivities toward a cognitive approach that summarises the theoretical construct to a single cognitive principle, such as Sperber & Wilson, and Carston (Carston 2002). Horn conceptualises the Gricean theory simply by saying that its aim is to offer a description of the speaker's intended meaning and includes implicature as a component of this intended meaning (Horn, 2005a). In addition to the previous

work in the field of pragmatics, other well-known pragmatic theories are delineated in the following sections that offer the strategies and super- strategies to examine deception objectively.

Deception

Deception linguistically is viewed as a speech act, a special social activity, or an indirect way of communication. Galasinski (2000) conceptualises deception as a pragmatic act that functions covertly and is disguised as normal cooperative behavior. Galasinski (2000) maintained that deception requires more cognitive effort in comparison with normal cooperative behavior, which operates naturally without hidden motives. Consequently, as a pragmatic act, deception requires an intention on the part of the agent to accomplish the deceptive perlocutionary effect on the audience. What differentiates deceptive behavior from the normal behavior of communication, according to Bok (1978), is that it requires a motive to operate while being spontaneous is not loaded toward specific hoped-for results. Dynamically it goes naturally without extra cognitive demands. The closely appropriate definition of deception, according to MocCornack (1992), is to observe it as a type of communication that functions through employing acts that aim at implementing false beliefs in the

addressee with exceptional cases. Puzynina (1992) views deception as a type of manipulation and justifies that by stressing the aim of the manipulator in exerting a certain required change in the audience's behaviors, thereby achieving the act successfully. Basically, the hope for success is going to materialise through maintaining the intention of the doer undercover and operating without outright force (cf. also Bursten, 1973; Goodin, 1980; Rudinow, 1978). From this perspective, deception as a phenomenon in communication is seen as a type of manipulation of verbal messages that could appear along the continuum of propositions that hold different degrees of truth and falsity (Puzynina, 1992). Vrij (2004), on the other hand, defines deception as a "deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to be untrue". Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, and Frith (2008) agree with this conceptualisation as they discuss the foregrounding two aspects highlighted here: initially, propositions with truth and falsity values are indicated, and simultaneously the deliberate intention of the manipulator in performing and delivering 'misleading information' is included. Finally, this act of communication accordingly is performed without 'forewarning.'

Super Strategies of Deception

To cover the process of deception comprehensively, it suggested that Pragma-dialectical theory may illuminate crucial aspects in this respect. This area of study considers argumentation as a dialogical performance where two agents engage and stick to their opposing propositions. Gradually, leading to a point where the two perspectives are brought together through a principled communicative process (Lauerbach and Aijmer, 2007). This theoretical account stresses some qualities of argumentation. Argumentation is a construction that contains communicative acts which are viewed collectively as one argumentative act. In compliance with this perspective, argumentation is perceived as a dialogical activity, where two actors or more are seeking to prioritise their standpoint. Consequently, an appeal to reason is used by the engaged parties (van Eemeren, 2018). This theory was initially introduced by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004), then revised by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2000, 2002, 2003, 2009a) and van Eemeren (2010). The theory emphasises the study of language in everyday communication and interaction and the system of critical reciprocity; hence, the title pragma-dialectical (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009b; van Eemeren,

Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2008). The aim of pragma-dialectical theory could be accomplished by adopting an ideal model that divides any argument structure into certain sequent stages with conventional speech acts for each stage. The first stage is the confrontation, which brings the opposing opinions into contact. The opening stage comes next, and it denotes the starting point of the discussion. The argumentative stage follows and contains the exchange of arguments. Ultimately, the concluding stage holds the results of the activity. Dialectical reasonableness is not the only mean at the disposal of arguers; they usually have the tool of rhetorical effectiveness. Therefore, the means are brought together under the term strategic maneuvering, which was originally proposed by van Eemeren (2010). This term stands for the effort paid by discussants to make an equal amount of reasonableness and effectiveness during the four stages of arguments (van Eemeren, 2010). Three aspects are emphasised accordingly, which basically depend on the choices made by participants to strategically navigate through the interaction (van Eemeren, 2010). The first step is that the doer has to decide from a range of topical potentials the most compatible one with the pursued goal (topical potential TP). Simultaneously, the doer should pay

attention to the audience's preferences and demands (Audience demand AD). Thereby, to accomplish the first two strategies, presentational devices are employed to ensure producing reasonable and effective verbal content (van Eemeren, 2010). A deceiver could operate in accord with pragma dialectical principles and the three strategic maneuvering super strategies.

Speech Acts Sub- Strategies

As a sub-field of pragmatics, the theory of speech actions was originated by Austin (1962) and then further developed by Searle (1969). Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1998) denote that the speech acts theory has the same essence as the theoretical investigation of argumentation, which is obtaining a common ground out of opposing opinions. Therefore, through speech acts theory, investigators have an appropriate analytical tool that results from mixing it with the argumentative data to come up with critical findings. In the same vein, Garssen (2010) points out that "van Eemeren and Grootendorst observe that speech act theory is the best analytical instrument so far developed in descriptive interpretative pragmatics." The difference between the two lies in that Searle conceptualises speech acts as a result of merging sentences with their illocutionary act. But, this is not applicable to the

argumentation doctrine. Thus, the illocutionary act has the main focus in speech act theory, while Eemeren and Grootendorst (1983) denote that "it should be noted that it is, of course, possible for two or more sentences to make up a single illocution." In that "many sentences together can form a single statement or piece of information and a recommendation or piece of advice can be so complicated that it is difficult to express in a single sentence." Thus, Speech act theory is seen as a significant tool for studying language use when discussing opposing perspectives and arriving at a common ground within the area of pragma-dialectical theory. The benefit may be greater when deception is included. This view would consider the verbal moves made in the different stages of a critical discussion to harness a point of agreement understood as speech acts. The well-known typology of speech acts offered by Searle (1969) will be utilised in this study. Searle's typology involves five groups of speech acts:

1- Representatives

These acts are utilised by speakers to communicate what they believe to be the truth. These acts convey word-to-world fit. As speakers, by employing them, they introduce beliefs about conditions that already exist in the world. the illocutionary

force of these acts is directed to make a believable personal representation of external situations. Representative acts take many types, such as SAs of "stating, suggesting, claiming, concluding, insisting, describing, hypothesising, predicting, announcing, attributing, affirming, alleging, classifying, denying, disclosing, disputing, identifying, informing, insisting, reporting, predicting, ranking, stipulating, and deducing." The critical discussion contains these acts because they present the opinions of participants in certain situations. Additionally, representative acts can be used in almost all stages of arguments Eemeren and Grootendorst (1998). These types of SAs are used to give a certain opinion beneath discourse and additionally to build the argument according to this adopted point of view, consequently determining the result of the discussion. Black (2006) proposes that "much fiction consists largely of representative speech acts; in particular, much of the narrator's activity consists of representative speech acts".

2- Directives

Speech acts in the form of commands are sometimes employed in a critical conversation, although there are exceptions. The speaker could use this type of act to manipulate the audience to obtain the perlocutionary effect desired. As when

asking, requesting, and preventing from doing some action. But in such a case, the speaker should have authority over the listener in order to exert such privilege; otherwise, it could be a request or an invitation.

3- Commissives

This act is used to mean that a speaker or author commits himself to the listener or reader to do some future action or to offer something. Commissives may take various functions in a discussion, as Mirza and Al-Hindawi (2016) list the following functions: a- to agree or refuse a particular perspective of view. b- to take responsibility for defending a certain attitude. c- to decide to begin a discussion. Pertinently, a critical discussion may contain the use of commissives, such as complying with the rules of the discussion, which can only be performed with the agreement and the will of the other party. Commissives can come as 'promising, pledging, threatening, refusing, volunteering, and vowing.'

4- Expressives

These are the speech acts that convey speakers' feelings. Therefore, the illocutionary force of these acts is to communicate the attitudes of their speakers about particular issues. These acts may take the form of 'deploring, welcoming,

praising, regretting, apologising, and thanking,' and so on.

5- Declarative

A declarative speech act is the fifth type of speech act. The speaker of such an act is a creator of a particular situation in reality. For example, if a CEO utters the following speech act to one of his employees: "You are fired." The speaker, in such a case, is not describing a state of affairs solely but creating a certain reality by his utterance. Actually, this type of speech act brings together the language used in the world. But, more importantly, this speech act requires a certain authority of the speaker in order to stand against the preliminary and doubtful utterance" (Fahmi& Rustono,2018). Therefore, declaratives may not be encountered in a discussion or in delivering an act of deception. Alternatively, Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) suggest the opposite of that by including the subtype of declarative 'usage declaratives.' This act can have a practical role in a critical discussion located in a noninstitutionalised environment. Eemeren et al. (2007) furthermore explain that "The goal of declarative usage which includes words like define, specify, explain, and elucidate—is to improve or simplify the listener's or reader's understanding of other speech acts." Hence, the reason behind this use is that "these speech acts are performed

by the speaker or writer to show how a certain speech act (or part of a speech act) should be interpreted." They suggest that the Usage declarations could be profitable in all stages of argumentation. In addition to that, the usage declarative could make the discussion simpler for the participants. Additionally, participants can employ these speech acts to criticise the approval and disapproval concepts. This does not deny other possible roles since these acts take the form of acquitting, disqualifying, declaring, and the like, which alter reality by their very utterance (Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2007).

Archer et al. (2012) document that Searle elucidates a number of felicity conditions responsible for the validation of SAs. Galasinski (2000) also indicates these conditions. Conditions usually work as a group of propositions that participants typically assume to be valid in the communicative situation when a certain SA is uttered. Accordingly, Galasinski (2000) lists these conditions as follows:

'Propositional content' conditions pertinent to the act.

'Preparatory conditions' involve the required contextualisation of background circumstances and knowledge about speakers/ writers and hearers/ readers that should exist prior to the production of the act.

'Sincerity conditions' stand for speakers'/writers' intentions, beliefs, and desires, and whether the speaker of the SA is performing his/her act seriously and sincerely.

'Essential conditions' address the illocutionary force of an act, more vividly, "what the utterance counts as." Galasinski (2000).

Galasinski (2000) emphasises the realisation that neglecting felicity conditions is the base for deception and other types of insincere phenomena. Obviously, this makes SAs a way of manipulating other people when used insincerely or when they hold a false presupposition that aims to perform a desired perlocutionary effect on the listener. Many situations explain this matter, such as when someone promises something he is not capable of doing in the future. Normally, the speaker is said to drop the sincerity condition concerning promising. Therefore, the violation of the sincerity condition is one of the main universal features of bad intention communication, to the extent that there is no diverted communication without the speaker/ writer being insincere, as Galasinski (2000) describes it. In other words, deception is basically conceived as a violation of the sincerity condition. Consequently, Birner (2013) states the fact that according to speech act theory,

successful usage of SAs is built on the assumption that SAs can only work if all parties assume that the speaker/ writer is being sincere.

Deceptive Sub- Strategies of Maxims Violations

Deception is tackled here in relation to Grice's conversational maxims violation. Since deception is generally viewed as a transgression of one or more of these maxims. In this regard, Grice's (1975) work is based on conversational maxims which support the Cooperative Principle that states: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." While Grice's (1989) maxims are the following:

1. The Quantity maxim, "Be informative," is supported by its two sub maxims:
 - "Make your contribution as informative as is required."
 - "Don't make your contribution more informative than is required."
2. The Quality maxim: "Try to make your contribution one that is true." This is supported by the following sub-maxims:
 - "Don't say what you believe to be false."
 - "Don't say that for which you lack adequate evidence."
3. The Relation maxim: "Be relevant."

4. The Manner maxim, "Be perspicuous," involves the following four sub-maxims:

- "Avoid obscurity of expression."
- "Avoid ambiguity."
- "Be brief" (avoid needless circumlocution).
- "Be orderly."

Furthermore, Grice (1975) emphasises that there are four strategies in which maxims can influence the way speakers typically manage their verbal contribution. As in the following:

- "Observe the maxims,"
- "Violate a maxim,"
- "Flout a maxim," or
- "Opt out of the maxims."

In this regard, Birner (2013) illustrates the above choices by saying that:

Maxim observing is about following them (i.e., Stating the required amount of information, being genuine, to the point, and transparent) (Birner, 2013).

Violating maxims is failing to observe them intentionally. But, in this case, the speaker supposes that listeners will not recognise that the maxim has been violated. An obvious example is a lie; in this case, speakers deliberately deceive other participants by using an utterance while knowing the falsity of their proposition and assuming that their listeners will not discover the truth (Birner, 2013). Therefore, maxim violation means

the intended action of misleading and deception.

Flouting a maxim is similar to violating it. Still, a crucial difference lies in the fact that flouting a maxim is done openly with the awareness of other parties. For example, a speaker tells another: "That exam was a breeze," but, typically, an exam and a breeze in a literal sense of the word are two different things (Birner, 2013).

Maxims Opting out is a rejection to take part in the encounter. For instance, a situation where a wife plans to argue with her husband, but he refuses to take action and just opens a newspaper and pretends to read (Birner, 2013).

Deception typically involves maxims violation which is pertinent to this study. Novels' context resembles real-world communication, which is why authors depict the characters' tendency to maxims violation so as to deliver their messages implicitly and to preclude the consequences if the act has been discovered. Consequently, deceivers may conceal information by violating the maxim of quantity and resulting in the strategy of deception, 'concealment.' Also, the violation of the quality maxim may result in a strategy of a deception called falsification. While distracting other participants from the real topic by violating the maxim of relevance or

equivocating and obscuring by violating the maxim of manner may result in the deceptive strategy of equivocation. In other words, deceivers breach the maxims of cooperativeness in order to accomplish their aims of deceiving people and controlling their perceptions. Although, maxims violation is done tacitly on the assumption that speakers are adhering to the maxims.

Galasinski (2000) maintained that maxim violation could be used in research of deception since maxim violation can be used as a framework for describing a number of deceptive strategies. In other words, maxim violation can function as a heuristic scheme for the analysis of deceptive messages that are actually a distortion of typical messages. Messages should be exact, informative, obvious, and pertinent (Galasinski, 2000). Accordingly, Galasinski (2000) states that the violation of the quality maxim is "the prototypical fabricated messages" that involve deformational variants of actual cases. Therefore, deception is the result of the violation of conversational maxims, which can trigger various deceptive strategies. Consequently, maxims violation is used in this study as pragmatic devices in the analysis of deceptive data to manipulate and shape others' thinking. In this vein, McCornack (2009) describes maxims breaching as follows: "Quantity violation

(complete omission of sensitive information, disclosure of some sensitive information, prolonging sensitive information). Quality violation (the presentation of completely fabricated information (lies) or distorted versions of sensitive information). Manner violation (manipulating clarity of expressions to fabricate messages)".

Pragmatic Deceptive Sub-Strategies of Presupposition

presuppositions and even implicatures as meaning constituents belong to the set of pragmatic phenomena that have been considered as the tools to fulfill strategic functions in discourse and which can also be cognitively captured. In this vein, implicatures may emphasise specific contents and foreground them by utilising contextual constraints. Presuppositions, on the other hand, might lead listeners to believe something or merely be unable to recognise the manipulative information that should be recognised (Saussure 2012, Polyzou 2013). Both phenomena are equal to cognitively manipulating other people and being able to limit the perception of the relevance of the critical information. As Richardson (2007) has asserted that not all the content is immediately there in a text to be simply gained as a vivid explicit meaning. This gives room for participants who have ulterior motives to be deceptive.

Richardson (2007) further alludes that there are hidden or presupposed meanings in texts, and these meanings can be used to manipulate and deceive since they present false information or information that may not be a fact. This means that presupposed content is taken-for-granted content, implicit meaning which is inserted behind the explicit meaning of a text or utterance. In previous research, Reah (2002) has asserted that presuppositions could be indicated by distinguishing what is called presupposition triggers. These triggers are constructions or elements that mark the phenomenon of a presupposition in an utterance. Reah (2002) presents three types of presupposition triggers:

- A- The First trigger comes through the use of certain words, such as change of state verbs. This change would technically present a presupposed meaning. For instance, the verb "begin" holds the presupposed meaning of a type of movement or taking action.
- B- The second presupposition trigger is the definite article "the" and the possessive pronouns "his/ her" (Reah, 2002). For instance, "The big guy" presupposes the existence of that guy with such a physical appearance. Reah (2002) investigates the use of false presupposition in political and war

news. As in the following example said by a reporter: "The revelation that Britain went to war on the basis of one page of legal advice," the presupposition here is that the revelation is not a fact.

- C- The third trigger is the use of Wh-questions, which offer a tool that is preferable in journalism often and definitely exists in novels since the context of novels as an imaginary world that is created by the author reflects a resemblance of the real world with the same verbal content and the same techniques. Richardson (2007) further states a presupposition that is distinguished as a "nominal presupposition." Consequently, this presupposed meaning is initiated by nouns and adjectives when they are used to qualify or modify noun phrases. Brown and Levinson (1987) also conceptualise presupposition as a technique used by speakers/ writers to presuppose something when they deceptively assume it is taken for granted by other listeners. But actually, this is not a fact. The idea of false presupposition builds around the intention made by speakers to pretend that they have the same values as their listeners about a certain predicate. In this

respect, speakers may choose to be deceptive and utilise some presupposition triggers with their presupposed load whose referents are familiar to the listener in order to attain their goal through ulterior means. Thus, presupposition gives the opportunity and space for performing deceptive acts. Therefore, due to its importance in shaping other people's perceptions of the world and its pragmatic value, it is used as an analytical model for investigating deception. Macagno and Walton (2014) state that this sub-strategy is used by the speaker as a trick to make the listener unconsciously adopt the proposition that is known to be potentially untrue, unshared, or undesirable without the outcome of a communicative breaking down. Therefore, deceivers, by following this sub-strategy, could achieve their goal, which is placing wrong, manipulated, or misleading perceptions in other participants through presuppositions that lack facts and their hidden claims disguised behind the explicit meaning of a text or utterance. The classification followed in this study is for Yule (2000). Accordingly, the triggers that are included are

existential (definite entities), lexical (the use of certain verbs, adjectives, and adverbs), and structural presupposition (a structure implanted with another larger structure).

Deceptive Politeness Sub- Strategies

Politeness sub-strategies have considerable importance in the communicative phenomenon of deception. In this regard, Thomas (1995) and Grundy (2000) assert that the most persuasive theory of politeness is Brown and Levinson's (1987). Originally, this theory of politeness was based on the concept of "face," which was introduced previously by Goffman (1967) and described as "every individual's feeling of self-worth or self-image... Everybody's face could be damaged, maintained, or enhanced for specific purposes". In accord with the purpose of this study, characters in the selected novels would perform in relation to the concept of face and typically try to sustain and enhance the face of other characters by including several politeness sub-strategies since the social life in novels is depicted by authors to resemble the real social life. Consequently, deceptive communication requires that the performers recognise and use effective strategies of deception to rule and persuade other minds. As far as the concept of face is concerned, Brown and

Levinson (1978) assert that "face" has two aspects: the positive and the negative. Accordingly, the positive face is the individual's desire to be accepted, honored, and appreciated by the group, while the negative face is the need not to be impeded or put upon to have the freedom to act willingly. Brown and Levinson (1987) further mention that the aspects of the face are considered conventional needs that everybody wants, and these needs are the responsibility of all the members to partially satisfy. In the imaginable context of novels, some characters pay attention to other targets' negative faces because they always attempt to show that they are not enforcing or pushing their listeners to act or to ponder in a particular way. In addition to the negative face, deception requires the use of listeners' positive faces. Therefore, the various politeness sub-strategies with their different realisations are employed for this purpose. These sub-strategies of politeness, as Brown and Levinson (1987) assert, are as follows: a. bald on record, b. positive politeness, c. negative politeness, and d. off record. Mills (2011), on the other hand, emphasises that Brown and Levinson's model of politeness is based on the "Model Person" that sees the participants in interaction as rational beings who engage and use language in order to attain their own short-term and long-term aims.

Ultimately, politeness, according to this perspective, is a creation of the rational strategic use of language by individuals to obtain their goals by resorting to calm and please their listeners and at the same time deceive them through half-truths, lies, and other manipulative information (Mills, 2011).

Bald on Record

The sub-strategy of politeness bald on record comes in accord with Grice's maxims to perform communications maximally and effectively. Reasonably, this strategy established that speakers/writers should behave verbally in accord with the maxims and achieve the goal systematically rather than worrying about other targets' face wants (Brown and Levinson, 1987).

Positive Politeness

The positive politeness sub-strategy and its realisations are a "redress directed to the addressees' positive face, their perennial desire that their wants, actions, and values should be thought of as desirable" (Brown and Levinson, 1987). This includes three techniques that are performed by speakers/writers. The first one is (a) supposing a common ground with hearers/readers by indicating that both speakers/writers and hearers/readers belong to some set of people with some shared wants, such as

values, perspectives, empathy, knowledge, goals, and attitudes, the second is (b) claiming that speakers/ writers and hearers/ readers are collaborators and have the same objectives, and thirdly (c) achieving hearers'/ readers' wishes for somethings (Brown & Levinson, 1987). These techniques initiate a number of manifestations that aim to lessen threats to hearers'/ readers' positive faces.

a- The first strategy (Be vigilant):

Followers of this strategy will pay attention to their hearers' interests, wants, needs, and values. A deceiver usually gives considerable care and takes notice of their targets' interests, needs, wants, and values when performing deceptive communication. Therefore, they should be aware of their hearers' minds, preferences, and needs with regard to the course or direction of the interaction.

b- The second strategy (looking for agreement):

For the same quest, Brown and Levinson (1987) said that a crucial part of seeking agreement includes focusing on the aspects of the current topic on which it is possible to obtain agreement and sustain them as possible. A deceiver may attack some community's defect to disguise the aim behind the discussion. Thus, seeking agreement on a particular aspect of the

subject would ease the deceptive communication on other points.

c- The third strategy (Justify)

Another way is to engage hearers in the activity in order for the deceiver to give A justification as to why they want what they want or why they discuss what they bring to the surface (Brown and Levinson, 1987). By doing so, targets are left to observe the reasonableness of what the speaker is communicating (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Deceivers, in most cases, would try to justify what they are providing by giving their listeners reasons, although sometimes they are not real or relevant.

Negative Politeness

Negative politeness is a redressive sub-strategy but in the opposite direction of the positive one. It includes acts pointed to the targets' negative faces (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Its negative redressive nature lies in the function of minimising imposition as possible on the targets' faces through the use of indirectness and hedges on the illocutionary force. This sub-strategy involves the following manifestations, which are included in the analysis of this study:

a- The First Strategy (Hedges):

According to Brown and Levinson (1987), the use of hedges is intended to redress targets' negative face wants by avoiding compulsion or lessening it through emphasising the speakers' perspectives of certain values. In addition to that, (Brown & Levinson, 1987) hedges are classified into 'strengtheners' function as intensive hedges, for example, "exactly," "precisely," or "emphatically," and 'weakeners' that soothe or "tentativize" something in the position of modifiers (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Ariel (2008) states that hedges are used to show what is stated as indirectly as possible. Ariel further adds that modal expressions (verbs or adverbs) are more common in the form of hedges. Accordingly, some verbs, other than modal verbs, for example, "feel" and "suppose," come in the form of hedges to allow speakers more freedom to state whatever they want impersonally and indirectly Loberger and Shoup (2009). Additionally, Loberger and Shoup (2009) assert that constructions without a definite subject such as "It is argued that" and "It has been agreed that" would typically function as hedges. Hence, these constructions provide speakers opportunities to avoid commitments to what they are communicating, and at the same time, they can deliver information (which are subjective views) without

stating them as personal opinions. In this respect, Evelyn (1992) argues that hedges are used as security tools since their value lies in protecting speakers from any negative consequences resulting from what is stated. Consequently, Fraser (2010) adds that hedging is mitigation to the full meaning and effect the meaning that the utterance would give, but words are not hedged. Actually, hedges accomplish different discourse functions, for instance: serving the speaker by avoiding responsibility for what is stated, covering facts, and decreasing the directness of information (Evelyn, 1992).

b- The second strategy (Using a general rule)

Using general rules is seen as a way of communicating that speakers do not prefer to clash with their listeners but are merely forced by contextual conditions to utter the act as an instance of some general social rule or some type of regulation. Pronoun avoidance is one of the uses of this strategy.

Off Record

Brown and Levinson (1987) assert that off record is a politeness sub-strategy that is used by speakers to leave a room for an escape or "out" by providing their listeners with a number of alternative meanings. In other words, speakers decide to use this

sub-strategy if they want to protect themselves from responsibility for stating some piece of information and provide their addressees the freedom to make their interpretations (Brown & Levinson, 1987). This sub-strategy also comes with different manifestations, such as the following:

a- The first strategy (Using Hints)

Speakers may resort to the use of hints when they want to state their contribution indirectly, such as "It is cold in here" to hint indirectly, "Shut the window" (Brown and Levinson, 1987).

b- The second strategy (resort to vagueness)

Speakers sometimes want to act verbally in accord with off record politeness strategy by being vague or ambiguous in order to conceal their true intention (Brown and Levinson, 1987). The means for this strategy may include the use of metaphor. Thus, metaphors come with various connotations, and it is sometimes complicated to decide which interpretation is intended. For example, "John's a pretty sharp cookie" has two interpretations; it could be a compliment and also an insult. Since "sharp" has two connotations, the negative and the positive (Brown & Levinson, 1987).

Figures of Speech

Figures of speech mean the opportunity to state a matter in different ways depending on the situation (McQuarrie and Mick, 1996). Thus, rhetorical figures are conceptualised (Corbett 1990) as "an artful deviation" from the conventional meaning of an expression. In other words, a rhetorical figure is conceived when an expression deviates from what is known. Accordingly, figures of speech are arranged into two classes: Schemes and Tropes. The class of Figures of speech schemes signals a deviation from the usual word arrangement. This means a change in the expected word order. For instance, ellipses and repetition. In contrast, a figure of speech from the Tropes class signals a change in the word's or phrase's significance or content. This class contains hyperbole, metaphor, etc. The aim of this study is fulfilled within the inclusion of tropes only. Tropes are figures of speech that are of crucial importance in pragmatics since they involve messages in order to convey an additional meaning which deviates from the literal meaning of the words. That's to mean it is a combination of the implied meaning and the literal one. Obviously, this is the doctrine of pragmatics which makes certain rhetorical figures of speech substantial strategies of rhetorical pragmatics. Furthermore, tropes are

arranged into two classes: Destabilisation and Substitution tropes (McQuarrie and Mick 1996). Destabilisation trop, as McQuarrie and Mick (1996) mention, is what results when "one means more than is said and relies on the recipient to develop the implications." Substitution tropes, on the other hand, as McQuarrie and Mick (1996) describe, are the use of tropes that mean "one says something other than what is meant, and relies on the recipient to make the necessary correction."

Overstatement (Hyperbole)

Overstatement (sometimes hyperbole) is the pragmatic rhetorical strategy described by Leech (1983) as "a case where the speaker's description is stronger than is warranted by the state of affairs described." In other words, the effect is to overstate or describe something from a point on a scale that is typically higher than the normal or current situation (Leech, 1983). Pragmatically, this would typically create an implicature that lies far beyond what is said. For example, "There were a million people in the Co-op tonight" holds the implied meaning of an excuse for being late. Likewise, "You never do the washing up" and "Why are you always smoking?" May give the illocutionary point of criticism (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Actually, rhetoric and deception can be mingled together.

Obviously, this can be grasped reasonably as a result of the fact that "truthful hyperbole is an impossibility." Since hyperbole as a rhetorical trop is nothing but an exaggerated point of view.

Understatement

According to Cruse (2006), understatement (sometimes litotes) is a figure of speech that involves the uttering of "quantity, intensity, or seriousness of something that is less than what is objectively the case" to bring about the required rhetorical effects. Leech (1983) defines 'understatement' as the opposite of overstatement. In other words, it resembles a context where the speaker's description is lesser "than is warranted by the state of affairs described". This strategy requires the violation of the quantity maxim. For example, "I was born yesterday," whereby the use of this trop typically refers to polite action. Also, it can be utilised to perform deceptive communication (Leech, 1983). Similarly, Harris (2005) emphasises that this trop is purposely used to describe something or someone insignificantly than the real state of affairs. As a result, the communicated evaluation of the seriousness, quantity, or intensity of some entity is definitely weaker than the actual description (Cruse, 2006). As a deceptive strategy, this trop can undermine some properties of the proposition intending to

deceive the target (Gupta et al., 2013). Generally, this type of verbal behaviour is the source of this pragma-rhetorical trope. This particular trop can trigger equivocation.

Allusion

This device is used to create a purposive ambiguity, which enables the speaker to refer to other entities covertly or indirectly (Lennon, 2004). Allusions, in this sense, are utilised strategically to alter the conventional content in order to produce other manipulated contributions with a certain meaning or emotion that would influence the audience.

Metaphor

A metaphor is a rhetorical figure which is formed as a term or an expression. This way of using language is utilised when the speaker\writer wants to present a notion that does not directly resemble the stated expression. As if to suggest a type of comparison to another subject or notion. As a rhetorical trope that is initiated due to a relation of similarities, typically, it functions by using a word or a phrase to indicate other things (Phillips, 2003). Basically, the phenomenon of metaphor is all about an intentional breaching of the conventional way of referring to something, reasonably, because it goes with indicating one thing through the

qualities of another. Thus, a metaphor is a tool that has a remarkable effect on minds and attitudes McGlone (2007). The advantage of this tool is to make abstract ideas easier to understand (Arends& Kilcher, 2010). Metaphor is a cognitive and discursively exploited phenomenon that is considered a persuasive and deceptive tool. In this regard, previous research has discussed at length the significance of this phenomenon in cognitive linguistics (Chilton 2005, Charteris-Black 2006a, 2006b, and Hart 2010 for illustrative studies).

Irony

The irony is the pragmatic- rhetorical trop that the speaker uses when wanting to mean the opposite of what he says. For instance, when someone says "what a sunny!" in bad weather (Xiang Li, 2008). Pragmatically speaking, irony is a strategy of language use that utilises indirect speech acts, and therefore it triggers conversational implicatures (Attardo, 2001).

Simile

Simile works in a similar way to metaphor. But, the comparison here is stated between two elements directly by using words such as "like" or "as" (Cruse, 2006). For instance, 'she is like an angel.'

Rhetorical Questions

Shaffer (2009) conceptualises rhetorical questions as the type of questions that are asked: "not for the purpose of eliciting an expressed answer, but rather for their rhetorical effect: an emphasis of the speaker's point." It comes into existence through the speaker's intention, and in order to make the needed perlocutionary effect on the listener, it passes the message skilfully. Galasiński (2000) adds that a rhetorical question may be used as a deceptive strategy in some cases when the speaker wants to present false information. Thereby implicating or presupposing a false claim. Roughly speaking, this strategy may help the speaker to allude to his malicious intention, which otherwise would be criticised if stated plainly (Abioye, 2011).

ARGUMENTATIVE APPEALS

Aristotle's argumentative appeals are remarkable persuasive sub-strategies that can be influential in the communicative act of deception in novels in the artificial world and in real life. Argumentative appeals are of three types:

Ethos

This type of appeal restores the authority and credibility of the speaker in addition to the moral values that listeners usually have in common with regard to the issue being

discussed. Using this appeal requires playing the role of a truthful, reliable communicator. Thus, the speaker should have such traits to have the right to perform an argument. The ability to persuade is determined by the reliability of the speaker. Accordingly, Boone and Kurtz (1999) conceptualise reliability as the "degree to which a statement, a person, and/or a company is perceived to be ethical, trustworthy, and sincere." In this sense, it is determined by the audience's degree to the speaker as to how "believable a speaker" is (Boone & Kurtz, 1999).

Logos

Logos are appeals to reasoning and evidence. When the speaker chooses to give evidence such as facts, proofs, details, figures, and numbers to support the claims, he wants to communicate. In this regard, logos appeals involve persuasion through reasoning. This means the employing of logic in arguments. From this perspective, being reasonable is a prerequisite quality to having a role in a rational discussion. Building the argument with reason affects the clarity degree of the claim, the logic derived from reason, and the impact of its confirming proof (Walton, 2007).

Pathos

Pathos is appeals that trigger and manipulate the emotions of the audience

(Richardson, 2007: 159). Generally, 'Pathos' as an emotional appeal is utilised to control the feelings of the addressees to be sad, angry, compassionate, afraid, distasteful, conceited, deferential, shameful, and another array of emotions. Typically, the goal is to elicit the emotions of the audience and direct them accordingly. Emotions, in this vein, are considered weak points and most often can instigate people to comply.

METHODOLOGY

Data Description

The Arabic novel (Palace of Desire) (1957)

Palace of Desire portrays the Al Jawad family, an ordinary middle-class Cairene family and Egyptian society in the mid-1920s. Additionally, it occasionally shows the violent clash between Islamic ideals, personal dreams, and modern realities. This novel, furthermore, emphasises the relationship of father and son and how the rebellious children struggle to move beyond their father's domination as they test the loosening reins of societal and parental control. It presents the saga of the family of al-Sayyid Ahmad Abd al-Jawad, the Cairene merchant owner. The context of the novel is marked by the loosening of patriarchal control in the central family; although Egypt has achieved

independence. Still, the British are in control behind the scenes. The details of the novel also portray the image of women and how they use their manipulation to survive.

The English Novel (East of Eden) (1952)

East of Eden was written by the Nobel Prize winner John Steinbeck and published in 1952. The set of the novel is in the Salinas Valley during the inception of the twentieth century and the end of World War I. This novel is a "modern retelling of the Genesis story of Cain and Abel." Nonetheless, Steinbeck adds his vision to the original story by making Cain (Cal Trask in the novel) the character that deserves the reader's sympathy; By showing the intention behind this character's destructive acts, which is to gain the love and acceptance of his father. The novel focuses on the human searching for love and how this longing can be the cause of evil on earth. It depicts the truth of humanity and unravels the intricate nature of family relationships. The writer makes an indirect message to call for individuality, free will, and social justice. With this well-crafted social context, women have a great role in building the plot and performing deception.

Data Collection

The researcher examines Arabic and English novels and chooses two novels with the same theme. Palace of Desire and East of Eden share the same concern in that both are directed to negotiate family relationships and the development of these relations over time. Conversations in both novels contain instances of deception that are employed by the authors. In addition to that, both novels are derived from normal life; hence they reflect reality in its harshness, unexpected changes, cruelty, and goodness. The relations under attention in these novels are of father and sons, brothers, and of second importance, husbands and wives. A discussion of modern philosophy and religious beliefs is also prevalent, Hence the continuous clash of successive generations. Typically, literature text is a mirror of the social nature of mankind, and in compliance with psychology, individuals, most of the time, perform many insincere interactions. This is evident in the book "Games People Play" (1964) written by the psychiatrist "Eric Berne." Unsurprisingly, these social novels from Oriental and western backgrounds have plenty of instances of deception.

Research Method

This study follows a qualitative descriptive method to tackle the extracted

data. "qualitative researchers seek to preserve and analyse the situated form, content, and experience of social action, rather than subject it to mathematical or other formal transformations" (Lindlof & Taylor 2002). Practically, qualitative methods are suitable for investigating 'deception' due to their flexibility since they are the means for getting "rich descriptions of complex phenomena" (Sofaer, 1999). Logically, the intricate nature of deception requires using qualitative methods to obtain the desired interpretations plus the social and cultural aspects of interest, and then to be in accord with the research aim and reinforce or build upon the qualitative analysis, quantitative means are employed.

Model of the Analysis

The model is eclectic and contains all the subjects discussed in section two.

CONCLUSION

The analysis shows that when deceivers are active during stages, the super strategies employed typically will be adopted to achieve the end or the goal of deceiving. This is when deceivers choose the right and suitable topic in addition to being careful and attentive to their audience's demands, including their preferences and main beliefs. The present

study exhibits, based on the findings, the following conclusions:

Actually, the analysis is limited to investigating three main types of deception. Namely, falsification, concealment, and equivocation. The English novel shows a high frequency and percentage of falsification, then the deceptive concealment strategy comes next, which leaves equivocation in the position of the least used deceptive strategy. The Arabic novel, on the other hand, shows concealment as the most used deceptive strategy, then falsification, and lastly comes equivocation. The selected data from both novels involve the deceptive strategies of falsification, concealment, and equivocation. The same super strategies and sub-strategies are utilised in both novels, which means both authors create a masterpiece of fiction. Religious background is evident in the data, where both authors emphasise the negative side of most religious traditions. These tendencies have deception as one main aspect. Thus, this could be identified in the Arabic novel through the character of Al-Sayyed Ahmed, who deceives his family with a religious identity. This identity is actually played occasionally in a family environment, but another one is evident in other situations when this character is with his friends. As for the English novel, the author is discussing an

ancient story of Cain and Abel and how it is repeated through generations, but it gives a justification and hero identity to Cain. Ironically, this is the total opposite of the original biblical story. In addition to the character of Cathy, whose deceptive and criminal actions are intended by the author to stand for another manipulative version of the biblical Eve. Apparently, both authors are so critical and opposed to how religion could be used and manipulated by people. Both types of data show a high frequency of stative SA; the English data have (52.7%) of insincere stative SA. However, the Arabic data have a percentage of (56.7). The English novel contains the presence of a psychopathic deceptive female character (Cathy). In contrast, the Arabic novel presents no such character. Arabic feminine characters usually present deception as a way of living and what can be called white lies, an attitude that would typically arise to overcome life vicissitudes. That is not the case with English feminine characters, who show selfishness. As far as sub-deceptive strategies are concerned, insincere SAs reach the percentage of (31.8%) in the English novel and (27.2%) in the Arabic novel. Then maxim violation scores the percentage of (19.4%) in the English novel and (20%) in the Arabic novel. The false presupposition sub-strategy has a percentage of (8.8%) in the

English data and (18.1%) in the Arabic data. PRTs scored (9.7%) in the English data and (14.8%) in the Arabic data. The English data show the percentage of (16.8%) of argumentative appeals, while the Arabic data contain the percentage of (11.8%). While politeness sub-strategies reach (13.2%) in the English data from the total number of sub-strategies, in contrast, the Arabic data show the percentage of (18.5%).

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